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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effects on welfare of a monetary policy that
establishes the reference interest rate at discrete intervals of time. The hypothesis is that
because there is uncertainty about various disturbances that will occur in the period in
which the referential interest rate is established, this can cause a loss of social welfare.
To analyze the problem, a model is proposed where the central bank minimizes a loss
function. When there is perfect certainty, an efficient frontier between the variances of
inflation and output is reached. With uncertainty the result is inefficient. This implies the
need to discuss whether it would be convenient for the interest rate to be set contingently.
The main limitation of the work is perhaps that the model used makes a large number
of abstractions, which allows it to be functional, but can leave out important aspects of
reality. There seems to be very few papers, in any, that deal with the problem addressed
in this work.
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Resumen
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los efectos sobre el bienestar que puede tener la
política monetaria que establece la tasa de interés de referencia por intervalos discretos de
tiempo. La hipótesis es que debido a que hay incertidumbre sobre diversas perturbaciones
que tendrán lugar en el período en que se establece la tasa de interés referencial, esto
puede causar una pérdida de bienestar social.
Para analizar el problema, se plantea un modelo donde el banco central minimiza una
función de pérdida. Cuando hay perfecta certidumbre, se alcanza una frontera eficiente
entre las varianzas de la inflación y el producto. Con incertidumbre el resultado es inefi-
ciente. Esto implica la necesidad de discutir si sería conveniente que la tasa de interés se
fijara de manera contingente.
La principal limitación del trabajo es tal vez que el modelo utilizado hace una gran
cantidad de abstracciones, lo que le permite ser funcional, pero puede dejar de lado
aspectos importantes de la realidad. Por otra parte, parece haber muy pocos trabajos, o
tal vez ninguno, que traten el problema particular analizado este artículo.
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1. Introduction
Currently, a large number of countries have established monetary policy inflation targets.
In this context, the central bank sets a goal for inflation and establishes a rule of interest
rates compatible with that objective.
A characteristic observed in most of the countries that have adopted this type of
monetary policy, is that the nominal interest rate that arises from the described interest
rate rule is established by a defined interval of time. In the United States, for example,
eight meetings a year are scheduled for the Governing Board of the Federal Reserve Bank
where it is possible to modify the federal funds rate. A very similar situation occurs in
Mexico, where eight to nine annual meetings of the Governing Board of the Bank of
Mexico are scheduled to analyze whether or not the interbank interest rate is modified,
the main instrument of monetary policy in this country.
If in the interval between two meetings of the corresponding committee there are
supply and/or demand shocks, the policy interest rate will remain unchanged. However, it
is possible that an optimal monetary policy would have been to modify the aforementioned
interest rate. It is also possible that once the corresponding committee meets again it is
no longer necessary to make changes to the monetary policy. In any case, failure to act
when necessary may have negative effects on well-being.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effects on welfare that monetary policy
that establishes the reference interest rate at discrete intervals of time may have. The
hypothesis of the article is that because there is uncertainty about the supply and demand
disturbances that will take place in the period in which the referential interest rate is
established, this can cause a loss of social welfare.
The aforementioned inefficiency is manifested in the fact that the two factors that
negatively affect a concept of well-being considered in the literature: the variance of
inflation and the variance of the output, are equal to or greater than the value that would
be observed if the interest rate could be modified at the moment in which supply and
demand shocks occur, or if these disturbances could be predicted in advance.
The work is divided into three sections:
The first makes a brief review of the literature on what in the context of the new
Keynesian economy literature is understood by optimal monetary policy, which assumes
that the economy is on a frontier that minimizes the joint variances of inflation and
output.
The second section establishes a model where one of two conditions occurs, or both:
the monetary authority can foresee the supply and demand shocks that will occur bet-
ween two consecutive meetings of the corresponding monetary policy committee, and/or
these meetings are not scheduled and they carry out whenever any of the disturbances
mentioned occurs. In this case we demonstrate that, in the presence of rational expecta-
tions, the central bank manages to reach a negative slope that minimizes a combination
between the variance of inflation and the variance of output.
The third section modifies the assumption of the model in the previous section that
the monetary authority can foresee the supply and demand shocks that occur between
two of the programmed meetings. In this case it is shown that the central bank will not
be able to be on the efficient frontier between the variance of inflation and the variance
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of the output, which implies, at least in theory, a loss of social welfare
Given the problem described, a possible solution discussed in the conclusions of the
work is not to schedule meetings of the monetary policy committee to analyze and/or
modify the interest rate of monetary policy, but to have these meetings in a completely
contingent manner.
2. Brief Review of the Literature on the Monetary Policy of In-
flation Targeting and the Relationship Between the Variance of
Inflation and the Variance of Output
In 1958, A.W Phillips found a negative relationship between the growth of nominal wages
and the unemployment rate in the United Kingdom. A little later, Samuelson and Solow
(1960) proposed the existence of a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, by which
the monetary authority could choose to have more than one evil, inflation, generating a
good, a fall of unemployment.
The tradeoff between inflation and unemployment was criticized a few years later by
Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) as a relationship that does not exist in the long term.
From these works arose the concept of natural rate of unemployment, a variable that does
not change although inflation changes substantially.
For many years, the concept of the natural rate of unemployment permeated and
became the mainstream in macroeconomics. There were some disagreements about the
concept in works such as those by Tobin (1972), Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) and
Graham and Snower (2002), but, although very interesting, these articles had little impact
on modifying what most economists of the mainstream thought.
After the international financial crisis of 2008-2009, some renowned economists have
again questioned the concept of natural rate of unemployment, so it seems that soon there
will be a great discussion on this issue (see Blanchard (2018)).
In 1979, John Taylor argued that although there was no long-term tradeoff between
inflation and unemployment, there was another type of tradeoff, which occurred between
the variance of inflation and the variance of output. Policies aimed at reducing the variance
of inflation increased the variance of output, and vice versa.
In the early nineties, New Zealand and the United Kingdom adopted a new type of
monetary policy which is known as inflation targeting.2 Later, many other countries did
the same. This type of policy assumes that the central bank will do everything possible to
achieve the proposed target. However, in practice the central bank also aims to stabilize
output along its trend.
Among the works that evaluate the effects of the inflation targeting policy are those
of Bernanke and Woodford (2005), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) and Blejer, et
al (2000). These authors find that this type of policy helps to get lower inflation in the
long term, have a lower response of inflation to oil and exchange rate shocks, strengthen
the independence of monetary policy and obtain inflation levels close to the target. When
disinflation has been achieved, the target of a long-term inflation that is no longer modified
are more easily reached.3
With the advent of inflation targeting, Taylor (1994) took up his idea of 1979, noting
that it is in the context of this type of monetary policy where there is a tradeoff between
the variance of inflation and the variance of output, which occurs in an efficient frontier
between these two variables (see also the work of Svensson (2008) for a similar conclusion).
The works of Ball (1997), Svensson (1997) and Fuhrer (1997) proposed models that
had two assumptions: inflation targeting and a function of social loss that was composed
of a weighted sum between the quadratic deviations of inflation with respect to its target
2New Zealand in 1990 and the United Kingdom in 1992.
3This is due to the fact that in the transition of the inflation targeting strategy the goals fall gradually.
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and output with respect to what is called the natural output4 By minimizing this loss
function, the central bank derives a rule of interest rates, very similar to the one also
proposed by Taylor (1993), which leads the economy to the efficient frontier between the
variance of inflation and the variance of output.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) question whether the function of social loss assumed
by the authors mentioned in the previous paragraph can be supported in microeconomic
terms, and find that under certain conditions it can be sustained (see also Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (1999) for a similar argument).
One conclusion of all these works is that the monetary policy of inflation targeting
results in a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for monetary policy to be efficient.
In this case, efficiency is defined as reaching the minimum frontier with a negative slope
between the variance of the output and the variance of inflation.
Some authors differ from the idea expressed in the previous paragraph. In particular
Cecchetti and Ehrman (1999) and Cecchetti et al (2002) document cases in which the
inflation targeting policy led to a strong volatility of output, which they consider not
necessarily optimal, since it is possible that the preferences of the central bank do not
reflect the preferences of the general public (an issue that has also been dealt by Svensson
(1997)).
Between the end of the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, a large amount of
work was carried out to analyze the empirical relationship between the variance of inflation
and the variance of output, which Taylor (1979) considered should be negative. Taylor
himself (1994) points out that it is not always true that there is a negative relationship
between these variances, which can occur when, even with inflation objectives, the central
bank has a rule of interest rates that is not optimal, or that in terms of the subsequent
works already analyzed, it does not minimize the social loss function.
Several authors find that at the empirical level there is a negative relationship between
the variance of inflation and that of output: Bean (1998), for example, estimates an
inverse relationship between these variables when the variance of inflation is high, but
this variance reaches a point where it practically becomes a constant. On the other hand,
Erceg, Henderson and Levin (1998) propose a model in which the negative relationship
suggested by Taylor (1979) (1994) arises. This model is calibrated for the United States,
finding that the tradeoff between the variances described is greater the more inflexible
wages are.
Other works in this line, such as those of Apergis (2003) for Greece and Adolfson et
al (2014) for Sweden, find that the adoption of a monetary policy with inflation goals led
to a reduction in the variances of inflation and output. Therefore, an inefficient monetary
policy was replaced by one that approached the efficient frontier proposed by Taylor
(1979) (1994). In general, empirical studies that find a negative relationship between the
variance of inflation and the variance of output imply in advance this relationship exists
when based on a theoretical model. What these works really do is to find indirectly the
parameters that shape the negative relationship described in a calibration exercise. In
works that use econometric methods, the evidence on the negative relationship of the
analyzed variances is much less convincing.
Following on from the above, the work of Lee (2002), which uses the GARCH method,
does not find a definite relationship between the variances described for the years 1960 to
1979. From 1980 until 1998 it finds a negative but very flat relation, with strong increases
in the variance of output that imply very small reductions in the variance of inflation, a
result very similar to that found by Bean (1998) for the United Kingdom.
Using methods similar to those of Lee (2002), Mendoza (2003) does not find a definite
4Adolfson et al (2014) point out that the natural output would be the one that emerges from the trend
of smoothing the GDP or its logarithm over time, while the potential output would be that which would
be reached if prices and wages were perfectly flexible.
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relationship between the variance of inflation and the variance of output in Mexico and
in Turkey.
In a much-discussed paper, Ball and Sheridan (2005) analyze the success of the infla-
tion targeting policy in the OECD countries. The authors conclude that the adoption of
the aforementioned policy did not significantly reduce the variances analyzed in this paper.
By reproducing the methodology of Ball and Sheridan (2005) for developing countries,
Goncalves and Salles (2008) find that the countries that adopted the policy of inflation
targeting did achieve a considerable fall in the volatilities of inflation and output relative
to the countries that did not. Batini and Laxton (2007) come to a similar conclusion when
analyzing another group of developing countries.
Other authors, such as Karanasos and Kim (2005) and Conrad and Karanasos (2008),
who use variants of the GARCH technique, find more complex relationships between the
variances described. In particular, Karanasos and Kim (2005) find that in Germany, the
United States and Japan the relationship between the analyzed variances is positive. For
their part, Conrad and Karanasos (2008) find that the variance of inflation positively
affects the variance of output, while the latter negatively affects the variance of inflation.
The literature on inflation targeting and the relationship between the variance of
inflation and the variance of output was very active from the mid-nineties to 2008. From
then on, it was significantly reduced, which is probably due to the international financial
crisis, which began that year, required the analysis of many experts who were dedicated
to the topics of interest that this article discusses.
Notwithstanding, the inflation targeting policy remains in force in many countries and
still presents challenges to address, such as the one we believe this work suggests.
3. The“Classic” Model of the New Keynesian Economy: There is
a Tradeoff Between the Variance of the Inflation and the Variance
of Output
One of the best known versions of the basic model of the new Keynesian economy assumes
that prices are set in staggered form (Taylor (1980), Calvo (1983)), which generates the
so-called new Phillips curve. Likewise, it is assumed that there is an IS function that
negatively relates output to the interest rate and the central bank minimizes a social loss
function, 5 which is a weighted sum of the quadratic deviations of inflation from its target
and output of its natural or potential level.
The new simplest Phillips curve is the one proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2001),
which is based on the work of Calvo (1983) and can be described as:
pit = Etpit+1 + δ (yt − y∗) + et (1)
Where pit is the current inflation, Etpit+1 is the expectation of inflation in the next
period conditioned by the relevant information in the current period. The variable yt is
the current output and y* is the natural or potential product, so yt − y∗ is the output
gap. The term et is a stochastic shock that is normally distributed and has zero mean.
The variance is constant and takes the value σ2.
The IS function of the economy is defined as:
yt = H − brt + vt (2)
This function establishes a negative consistent relationship between output (y) and
the interest rate r. The parameter v is also a demand shock, which is normally distributed
with zero mean and constant variance σ2v .
5Ball (1997), Fuhrer (1997) y Svenson (1997) trabajan con una curva de Phillps antigua y también
con una función IS con la forma sugerida por Hicks (1937). Clarida, Gali y Gertler (1999) trabajan tanto
con una nueva curva de Phillips como con una nueva función IS.
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The parameter H could represent a term related to fiscal variables, where increases
in government spending increase H and increases in the income tax rate reduce it. Other
variables of the private sector, such as autonomous consumption, can also be included in
the H parameter.
In the “classic” approach of the new Keynesian economy, the central bank has a well-
defined objective that consists of minimizing a loss function (see for example Svensson
(1997)), which is posed as:
Lt = ϕ(pit − pi∗)2 + (1− ϕ)(yt − y∗)2 (3)
Where pi∗ is the target inflation. (pit − pi∗) is the inflation gap.
The loss function is quadratic, as in the Barro and Gordon model and (Barro and
Gordon (1983)).6 The best result for the central bank, and ideally for society, is to have
a current inflation pit equal to the goal pi∗ and output yt equal to the natural one and y∗.
Any other solution generates a positive loss.
The parameter ϕ represents the relative importance that the central bank assigns to
stabilize inflation around its goal in comparison with the importance it gives to stabilize
output (0 < ϕ < 1). When ϕ is 1, the central bank is fully committed to inflation
reaching its target. On the contrary, when ϕ = 0 (1− ϕ = 1) the central bank only aims
to stabilize output. In practice, the central institute takes into account both objectives.7
The loss function of the central bank in equation (3) has been discussed in the litera-
ture. Svensson (1997) says that ideally this function should represent society’s preferences
about output and inflation’s stability and not the preferences of the monetary authority.
If the central bank effectively takes into account the preferences of the society, then in
carrying out its monetary policy will be reducing as much as possible the social loss.
However, Svensson (1997) also states that not always the social’s loss function reflects
the preferences of society, but it can only reflect the preferences of the members of the
committee that decides the monetary policy. This problem has also been discussed by
Cecchetti and Ehrman (1999) and by Cecchetti et al (2002), who argue that when the
central bank sets a parameter ϕ in 1, it generates, as we will see soon, a volatility of
output that hardly reflects what society really wants.
In the literature it has been discussed whether the loss function proposed by Ball
(1997), Fuhrer (1997) and Svensson (1997) can really reflect welfare terms of private
agents. According to Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), under certain assumptions, the
loss function can reflect the welfare parameters of the private sector.
On the other hand, the inflation goal pi∗ and the natural output y∗ are concepts that
require an additional explanation:
In theory, the target of zero inflation would be a desirable long-term goal, since that
implies price stability. However, most of the countries that have adopted the monetary
policy of inflation targeting have inflation goals of between 0 and 3%, with an average
perhaps centered on 2%. The reason why the inflation target is not exactly zero is related,
according to a report by the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States,8 with the fact
6An important difference of the approach proposed here with that of Barro and Gordon (1983) is that
for these authors the goal of the product is greater than the natural product
7Svensson (2008) argues that while some central banks have as sole commitment to achieve low
inflation, in practice they all worry about stabilizing output.
8The report of the Federal Reserve Bank says: “The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) judges
that inflation at the rate of 2 percent (as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal
consumption expenditures, or PCE) is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s
mandate for price stability and maximum employment. Over time, a higher inflation rate would reduce the
public’s ability to make accurate longer-term economic and financial decisions. On the other hand, a lower
inflation rate would be associated with an elevated probability of falling into deflation, which means prices
and perhaps wages, on average, are falling–a phenomenon associated with very weak economic conditions.
Having at least a small level of inflation makes it less likely that the economy will experience harmful
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that a lower goal of 2% presents risks that the economy will fall in deflation, which could
generate very harmful effects on economic activity. Another reason why in some countries
the inflation target is not zero is because they are in the process of consolidating low
inflation after having periods of high price growth two or three decades ago. This could
be the case in Mexico, where the inflation target is 3% (see Mishkin and Shmidt-Hebbel
(2007) for a similar argument).
It is also very important to define the natural output. In this article we define this
concept as the trend of GDP over time. Statistical techniques such as the Hodrick-Prescott
filter, or other methodologies, allow obtaining this concept empirically. Adolfson et al
(2014) point out that an alternative definition is that of the potential output, which
would manifest itself when there are totally flexible prices and salaries.
In an analysis for Sweden, the authors mentioned in the previous paragraph affirm
that depending on which definition of natural output is used (the trend or what would
happen when there are totally flexible prices and salaries) the short-term substitution
coefficient of the Phillips curve between inflation and the output gap (the parameter δ
in the Phillips curve in equation (1) of this paper) changes dramatically. By the same
token, it would also change the long-term tradeoff between the variance of inflation and
the variance of output the long term, as we will see in the following pages.
Considering again the equations of the model already described, the primal problem
of the central bank is to minimize the loss function (3) subject to equation (1) of the
Phillips curve. This will generate a relationship between the output gap and the inflation
gap (pit − pi∗) or a concept similar to it. To obtain this function, the central bank has
to establish a monetary rule for the interest rate, which is the well-known Taylor rule
(Taylor (1993)).
The minimization of the social loss equation (3) subject to the Phillips curve equation
(1) results in:
yt − y∗ = −ϕδ(Etpit+1 − pi
∗)
(ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ)) −
ϕδet
(ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ)) (4)
This equation, which we will call aggregate demand, shows a negative relationship
between the output gap (yt − y∗) and a similar term to the inflation gap (pit − pi∗), in
this case (Etpit+1 − pi∗).
For equation (4) to be really the aggregate demand, the central bank has to establish
the Taylor rule of interest rates, which arises from substituting equation (4) in the equation
IS (2), which gives as a result
rt =
H − y∗
b
+
ϕδ(Etpit+1 − pi∗)
(ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ))b +
ϕδet
(ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ))b +
vt
b
(5)
Equation (5) is the Taylor rule of interest rates (the MP equation of the Romer and
Taylor model, see Romer (2000), Taylor (2000)). When inflation and its expectations are
equal and the stochastic shocks of supply and demand are zero:
rt =
H − y∗
b
= r∗ (6)
Where r∗ is the natural rate of interest, a term that was defined more than 100 years
ago by the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell (Wicksell (1898)).
In the traditional analysis of the IS-LM model (Hicks (1937)), the natural interest
rate depends on the H parameter, which is partly determined by fiscal policy. Higher
deflation if economic conditions weaken. The FOMC implements monetary policy to help maintain an
inflation rate of 2 percent over the medium term.” Esta aseveración se encuentra en la página de internet
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/economy_14400.htm.
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government spending, or a reduction in the income tax rate, are factors that increase the
natural rate of interest and, through the Taylor rule (5), the present interest rate.9
The dual problem is to replace the Taylor rule (5) in the IS (2) function. The result is
aggregate demand (4). Clearly, the Phillips curve (1) and the aggregate demand (4) are
the relevant equations to solve for inflation (pit) and output (yt), while the IS function
solves for the interest rate rt.10
The way to solve for inflation and output is to replace the output gap (yt-y*) of
aggregate demand (4) in the Phillips curve (1), which results in
pit =
(1− ϕ)
ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ)Etpit+1 +
ϕδ2
ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ)pi
∗ +
(1− ϕ)
ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ)et (7)
This semi-reduced form indicates that inflation depends on future inflation expecta-
tions, the inflation target and the supply shocks et. In the absence of stochastic supply
shocks, inflation would be a weighted average of its expectation in the future and of
the central bank’s target. For its part, the semi-reduced form of output is the aggregate
demand itself (4), which does not depend directly on the level of inflation.
The reason why we call semi-reduced forms to equations (4) and (7) is because in
models of rational expectations such expectations are endogenous. If they were exogenous,
then the aforementioned equations would be reduced forms for inflation and output, but
they are not properly so because the value of expectations must be resolved according to
exogenous variables of the model.
To endogenize expectations, it is necessary to solve, first, equation (7) as an equation
in forward differences, which can be carried out using a forward operator or a recursive
substitution into the future (see Goldberg (1986) and the chapter 8 by McCallum (1989)).
To simplify the notation, we define:
j =
ϕδ2
(ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ)) (8)
1− j = (1− ϕ)
(ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ)) (9)
Therefore, equation (7) becomes
pit = (1− j)Etpit+1 + jpi∗ + (1− j)et (10)
If a recursive solution is made to the future, it must be considered, taking into account
equation (10), that
Etpit+1 = (1− j)Etpit+2 + jpi∗ + (1− j)Etet+1 (11)
Substituting (11) in (10), and repeating the exercise recursively for later periods, up
to a period t + n:
pit = (1− j)nEtpit+n + jpi∗
n∑
i=0
(1− j)i +
n∑
i=0
(1− j)i+1Etet+i (12)
9A very different result arises when the IS comes from optimization in consumption (see McCallum
and Nelson (1999) or King (2000)). In this case, the natural rate of interest is equal to the subjective
discount rate of the intertemporal utility function of consumers.
10It is interesting to note that the form of the IS function is irrelevant in the solution of inflation
and output. A new IS function could be used, such as those used by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999),
McCallum and Nelson (1999), King (2000) and Blanchard (2008) and the results for inflation and output
and its variances would be exactly the same.
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Taking the limit of this equation when n tends to infinity, we will find
limn→∞pit = pi∗ + (1− j)et (13)
This is because
limn→∞(1− j)nEtpit+n = 0 (14)
Transversality condition
jpi∗
∞∑
i=0
(1− j)i = jpi
∗
(1− (1− j)) = pi
∗ (15)
∞∑
i=0
(1− j)i+1Etet+i = (1− j)et (16)
The transversality condition (14) assumes that the expectation of inflation in a very
distant future period (Etpit+n) has a finite value, so multiplying it by the factor (1− j)n
takes a value very close to zero (this is because j is a parameter less than unity, which
can be observed in equations (8) and (9)).
For its part, and again taking into account that j is a parameter less than unity, the
value
∑∞
i=0 (1− j)i in equation (15) converges to factor 1/j, which multiplied by jpi∗
yields pi∗.
Finally, the sum
∑∞
i=0 (1− j)i+1Etet+i is simply equal to (1 − j)et, since Etet = et
and Et(et+i) for any period i positive is zero. This is because it is assumed that supply
shocks have zero mean and they are not autocorrelated.
The difference equation (10) is a stable equation, because the parameter j is less than
unity. It is equivalent to a first-order difference equation that is solved in the traditional
way when looking at the past.
A possible alternative solution to equation (10) is to use a forward operator, whose
form has been shown to arrive at a known solution (see Goldberg (1986)). In this case, it
is defined:
Etpit+1 = L
−1pit (17)
Where L-1 is the forward operator
Substituting (17) in (10) we get:
pit =
jpi∗ + (1− j)et
(1− (1− j)L−1) (18)
In the literature on the solution of difference equations (Goldberg (1986)) it is known
that
xt
(1− (1− j)L−1) =
∞∑
i=0
(1− j)iEtxt+i (19)
Where x is any variable, it can even be a constant.
Therefore, when applying (19) to (18) we get:
pit = jpi
∗
∞∑
i=0
(1− j)i + (1− j)
∞∑
i=0
(1− j)iEtet+i = pi∗ + (1− j)et (20)
That is the same solution for inflation that the one shown in (13).
For the totally reduced solution for output, the aggregate demand (4) is rewritten as:
yt − y∗ = − j
δ
(Etpit+1 − pi∗)− j
δ
et (21)
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But using equations (13) o (20) it is possible to show that
Etpit+1 = pi
∗ (22)
Therefore, the reduced form for output is:
yt = y
∗ − j
δ
et (23)
Positive supply shocks (et < 0) generate a situation where output increases above
its natural level and inflation falls. However, given the assumptions of the model, the
impact of these shocks is diluted in one period. It should be noted that demand shocks
do not affect the system of output and inflation because, when they occur, the Taylor
rule indicates that the interest rate must be increased to cancel its effect on inflation and
output (see equation (5))).
We will now show that there is a tradeoff between the variance of output and the
variance of inflation. Output will vary the more the central bank is committed to kee-
ping inflation close to the target pi∗, and vice versa. The non-conditional expectation for
inflation in equations (13) or (20) is pi∗, since the non-conditional expectation for the
stochastic supply shock is zero. Therefore, the variance of inflation is:
V ar (pit) = E(pit − E (pit))2 = E(pit − pi∗)2 = (1− j)2σ2 (24)
At the same time, the non-conditional expectation of the product in equation (23) is
y∗ for the same reason that was explained for the previous equation, then:
V ar (yt) = E(yt − E (yt))2 = E(yt − y∗)2 = j
2
δ2
σ2 (25)
The parameter j is directly related to ϕ, which represents how much commitment
the central bank has with the inflation target compared with the objective of stabilizing
output. When ϕ=1, then j=1 and the central bank is solely committed to keeping inflation
at its target pi∗. When ϕ = 0, j=0 and the central bank only wants to keep output at its
natural level y*.
There is a monotonic relationship between j and ϕ, which can be observed by taking
the derivative of j with respect to ϕ in (8):
dj
dϕ
=
δ2
(ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ))2 > 0 (26)
dV ar (pit)
dj
= −2(1− j)σ2 < 0 (27)
dV ar(yt)
dj
= 2
j
δ2
σ2 > 0 (28)
The more the central bank commits itself to the inflation target pi∗ (the larger are ϕ
and j), the lower the variance of inflation and the greater the variance of output.
The highest possible variance of output and the minimum variance of inflation occurs
when ϕ = 1 = j. In this case, the central bank is fully committed to the inflation target,
then
V ar (pit) = 0 (29)
V ar (yt) =
σ2
δ2
(30)
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The highest possible variance of inflation and the minimum possible variance for ouput
occurs when ϕ = 0 = j, this happens when the central bank wants to keep output at all
costs at its natural level y*.
V ar (pit) = σ
2 (31)
V ar (yt) = 0 (32)
The function that shows the tradeoff between the variance of inflation and the variance
of output surges solving for j in (25) and substituting in (24), which results in:
V ar (pit) = σ
2 − 2 (V ar (yt))1/2 δσ + V ar(yt)δ2 (33)
It is possible to prove that this function has a negative slope, since the first derivative
of the variance of inflation with respect to the variance of output is:
d(V ar (pit))
d(V ar (yt))
= − (V ar (yt))−
1
2 δσ + δ2 (34)
For this derivative to be negative, it is necessary that
− (V ar (yt))−
1
2 δσ + δ2 < 0 (35)
But that implies
σ2
δ2
> V ar(yt) (36)
Which is true because the maximum variance of output is exactly σ2/δ2.
On the other hand, the second derivative is positive, which shows that there is a
convex relationship in the plane where the variance of inflation is on the vertical axis and
the variance of output is on the horizontal axis. The latter can be observed by taking the
second derivative in (34):
d2V ar(pit)
d(V ar (yt))
=
1
2
(V ar (yt))
−3/2
δσ > 0 (37)
Equations (34), (36) and (37) show that in the plane where the variance of inflation is
on the vertical axis, and the variance of output is on the horizontal axis, the relationship
between these two variables is inverse and convex to the origin.
On the other hand, the expected value of the loss function (3) is a linear relationship
between the variance of inflation and the variance of output. This can be observed by
applying the non-conditional expectation operator to equation (3) and considering the
results already analyzed, where the expected non-conditional values for inflation and
output are, respectively, pi∗ and y*.
E (Lt) = ϕE(pit − pi∗)2 + (1− ϕ)E(yt − y∗)2 =
ϕE(pit − E (pit))2 + (1− ϕ)E(yt − E (yt))2
= ϕV ar (pit) + (1− ϕ)V ar(yt) (38)
The endogenous solution for the variance of output and the variance of inflation occurs
in the tangency between the function of variances (33) and the expected function of loss
(38). There is only one variance function, but there is a dense map of expected loss
functions, all of them linear.
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Figure 1. The tradeoff between the variance of inflation and the variance of output in
the “classical” model of the new Keynesian economics.
3. An Alternative Approach in the Spirit of the New Keynesian
Economy: In Presence of Imperfect Information the Negative Re-
lationship Between the Variance of Inflation and the Variance of
Output May Disappear
As we have seen, by minimizing the loss function the central bank has to establish a rule
of interest rates, the famous Taylor rule (equation (5)) (Taylor (1993)). When the central
bank anticipates all the possible supply and demand shocks that will occur during the
period in which a level of interest rates is established, the interest rate rule includes these
disturbances. We consider it convenient to repeat equation (5):
rt =
1
b
(H − y∗ + ϕδ
(ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ)) (Etpit+1 − pi
∗) +
ϕδ
(ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ))et + vt) (39)
In real life, information is limited. Central banks set levels of interest rates at discrete
points of time, usually at meetings of the governing board of said institutions. Assuming
that the periods last symmetrical intervals, for example one month and a half or three
months, it is clear that if the central bank sets the interest rate at the beginning of the
period, or at the end of the previous period, it will not be able to forecast at least some
supply and demand shocks that will occur during the time the interest rate remains fixed.
In this section we assume the opposite case to that of the first section. The central bank
sets the interest rate for period t in period t-1. The governing board of the central bank
does not know at that time whether there will be supply or demand shocks in period t. The
best forecast for these shocks is that they have a value of zero, because the assumptions
of the previous section that is the conditional and non-conditional expectations of those
disturbances.
Usually, central banks set nominal interest rates and not real rates. Given the infor-
mation that the central bank has in the period t-1, a reasonable proxy of the optimal rule
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(39) would be to establish the nominal interest rate as follows:
Rt = Et−1pit+1 +
1
b
(H − y∗ + ϕδ
(ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ)) (Et−1pit+1 − pi
∗)) (40)
Where R is the nominal interest rate that will prevail in t but that is established at
the end of period t-1.11
However, the definition for the real interest rate is:
rt = Rt − Etpit+1 (41)
The substitution of (40) in (41) in the IS (2) equation results in:
yt = y
∗ − ϕδ
(ϕδ2 + (1− ϕ)) (Et−1pit+1 − pi
∗)− b(Et−1pit+1 − Etpit+1) + vt (42)
That is an aggregate demand slightly different from that found in equation (4) in the
problem of minimization of the social loss function of the previous section.
Substituting this aggregate demand (42) in the new Phillips curve (1) we obtain:
pit = Etpit+1 − jEt−1pit+1 + jpi∗ − bδ (Et−1pit+1 − Etpit+1) + δvt + et (43)
Where j is defined exactly the same as in equation (8) of the last section.
Applying the conditional expectation operator in t-1 to equation (43) and using the
law of iterated expectations, where
Et−1Etpit+1 = Et−1pit+1
Et−1Et−1pit+1 = Et−1pit+1 (44)
We get
Et−1pit = (1− j)Et−1pit+1 + jpi∗ (45)
It is possible to solve this difference equation as in the previous section, by a recursive
substitution method or by using a forward operator. If we choose this last method, we
find that
Et−1pit =
jpi∗
(1− (1− j)L−1) (46)
But for the known solution that has the use of this forward operator (see Goldberg
(1986)), it can be concluded that
Et−1pit = jpi∗
∞∑
i=0
(1− j)i = jpi
∗
(1− (1− j)) = pi
∗ (47)
This equation in first order differences of expectations has a stable solution because j
<1.
Given the equation (45) it is also true that in the period t+1
Etpit+1 = (1− j)Etpit+2 + jpi∗ (48)
Therefore, doing exactly the same procedure above:
Etpit+1 = pi
∗ (49)
11Strictly for this model Rt is set in t-1. It is not possible to algebraically distinguish between the
beginning and the end of a period in discrete time.
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Applying to this solution (49) the operator of expected value in t-1 and taking into
account the law of iterated expectations:
Et−1Etpit+1 = Et−1pit+1 = pi∗ (50)
Substituting (49) and (50) in (43) is the reduced form for inflation
pit = pi
∗ + δvt + et (51)
Also, replacing (49) and (50) in the aggregate demand (42), we find the reduced form
for output.
yt = y
∗ + vt (52)
In this case, positive demand shocks (v>0) increase inflation and output above their
long-term values, while supply shocks only affect inflation.
The non-conditional expected values for output and inflation are y* and pi∗, respecti-
vely, from which it follows that:
V ar (pit) = E(pit − Epit)2 = E(pit − pi∗)2 = δ2σ2v + σ2 (53)
V ar (yt) = E(yt − Eyt)2 = E(yt − y∗)2 = σ2v (54)
The variances of inflation and output are different from the case in which there is
perfect information. When the Taylor rule for period t is set at t-1, the analyzed variances
have no relation to central bank preferences. Therefore, there is not any tradeoff between
them.
It is relatively easy to prove that the limited information of the central bank generates
an inefficient solution with respect to the case described in the previous section. This can
be observed by making a diagram where the variance of inflation is on the vertical axis
and the variance of the product on the horizontal axis.
Figure 2. Solution for the variances of inflation and output when there is limited
information and its comparison to the case of perfect information.
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The solution for the case of imperfect information occurs at the point where the
vertical and horizontal straight lines that are in the diagram intersect, while the solution
for the case of perfect information occurs in the tangency of the convex efficient frontier
and the line of negative slope that represents the expected loss function.
Geometrically, the equilibrium point of the variances in the case of imperfect infor-
mation is always to the northeast of the solution with perfect information. We know this
with certainty, because the variance of inflation in the case of imperfect information is
δ2σ2v + σ
2, which is always greater than the maximum variance that inflation can obtain
when there is perfect information, which is σ2. In the case of imperfect information, it
could happen the variance of output could be smaller than the one that takes place in
perfect information, but even so the equilibrium point of the variances would be above
the efficient frontier.
4. Conclusions
The new Keynesian economy has proposed the existence of a tradeoff between the varian-
ce of inflation and that of output. Central banks that are strongly committed to meeting
their inflation target will generate a greater variance of output.
In this paper we show that, when the central bank does not have perfect information,
the inverse theoretical relationship between the variances of inflation and the one of
output can be broken. This sometimes happens because central banks set interest rates
for well-defined time intervals. If the establishment of the interest rate occurs before
various supply and demand shocks occur, this information cannot be incorporated into
the monetary policy instrument. In that case, the effect of these disturbances on the
variances and inflation and the one or output can be very different from the case where
the central bank can foresee these shocks.
The result is that under perfect information, the solution is sub optimal and, at least
in theory, reduces social welfare in relation to the case where there is perfect information.
Would it be convenient for the central bank’s board of governors to stop having pe-
riodic meetings in which the interest rate can be modified and act in a purely contingent
manner? The results of this work support this proposal in some way. However, perhaps
that would cause uncertainty in financial markets, so a better solution would be to set
intervention thresholds. If supply and demand shocks are small, the loss in welfare of not
being able to forecast them is also small. If they are large, it would be better to intervene
contingently.
Even if the central bank could modify the interest rate at all times, the problem that
we have analyzed would arise if there is not complete information about the state of the
economy. Sometimes, it is not known what is happening with the economic activity and
official figures about what is really happening at any given time may take months to be
published. Hence, the use of coincident and advanced indicators is crucial for decision
makers.
The model used in this article abstracts from many aspects of reality. This allows it
to be functional, while at the same time it can rescue the main aspects of the relationship
between the variances of inflation and output that have been analyzed in more complex
contexts. Its relative ease and functionality also allow the model to explore relevant as-
pects in the presence of uncertainty, which is the main objective of the work. Among the
great advantages it has is to offer exact analytical solutions to the endogenous variables,
something that could not be achieved if there were, for example, non-linear elements.
However, it must be recognized that due to the abstraction that it does, the presented
model is not designed to carry out simulations or calibrations with data from specific
countries, which constitutes a limitation and, at the same time, a challenge to be overcome
in the future.
An important point to note is that, as far as our possibilities have come, we have not
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been able to find academic works that analyze the problem presented here, which is the
uncertainty generated by the way in which decision-making is designed to modify the rate
of interest of the monetary policy.
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